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The New “Extended Family”— 
“De Facto” Parenthood and Standing 
Under Chapter 2∗ 
Gregory A. Loken∗∗ 
Can parental rights—and, by implication, children—be acquired 
by adverse possession? More concretely, as now proposed by the 
American Law Institute, should ex-stepparents, ex-live-ins, and other 
adults who have shared living quarters with a parent and a child for 
two years have the right to litigate custodial rights with the natural 
parents? 
Given the importance of the family as the repository of many of 
our deepest hopes for happiness—and what Justice Blackmun called 
the “vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of . . . 
family life”1—it may not seem to be a cause for celebration that the 
American Law Institute has found it necessary to promulgate the 
comprehensive Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (the 
“Principles”), which, among other proposals, offer strong protection 
for the rights of “de facto” parents.2 But the Principles are a wel-
come document. In the face of growing chaos in judicial and legisla-
tive approaches to family problems, especially those involving alloca-
tion of responsibility for children,3 it offers an opportunity for clarity 
 
 ∗ I am very grateful for the insightful comments of Brian Bix and David Rosettenstein 
on an earlier version of this paper. They bear, of course, no responsibility for any errors that 
remain.  This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Family Dissolution Princi-
ples, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb. 1, 2001. 
 
∗∗ Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law. 
 1. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 2. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft no. 4, 2000) (approved May 15–18, 2000, scheduled 
for publication in 2001) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)] and PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 
3, pt. I, 1998) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I)]. 
 3. In the past thirty years at least eight different presumptions for determining child 
custody have prevailed in statutes and case law, often in combination with each other and a 
variety of other criteria: (1) the now generally abandoned “tender years” doctrine, which gave 
strong preference to maternal custody of pre-adolescent children, see, e.g., Silvestri v. Silvestri, 
309 So. 2d 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); (2) the general “best interests” test, which requires a 
court to determine in which placement a child is most likely to flourish, with several factors 
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and synthesis. And in its bold attempt to reformulate—really to revo-
lutionize—the law of child custody, it evidences a deep commitment 
to the protection of children in circumstances where traditional fam-
ily structures are absent or in disarray. 
The custodial principles contained in the ALI’s new document 
are, of course, not the only radical proposals it encompasses.4 But 
chapter 2 of the new document—“Principles Governing the Alloca-
tion of Custodial and Decisionmaking Responsibility for Chil-
dren”5—is arguably the most crucial component of a new vision of 
the family offered by the Principles. For it is in this section that the 
drafters outline who will have power over the lives of children, and 
propose an important new category of nonbiological but legal par-
 
usually listed as “relevant” but not dispositive, see UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 401, 
9A U.L.A. 263–64 (1998); (3) the “primary caretaker” presumption, which awards custody to 
the parent who had spent most time meeting the child’s physical and developmental needs, 
and which seemed to gain ground rapidly since its first adoption in Garska v. McCoy, 278 
S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981), only to fall from favor in many states, including West Virginia, 
which eliminated it in 1999, 1999 W. Va. Acts, 2d. Extra. Sess., Ch. 10 (codified at W. VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 48-11-101 to -11-604 (1999)); (4) a now widely favored presumption in favor 
of joint custody, which in theory, though often not in practice, gives equal custodial responsi-
bility to each parent, with some states subordinating this to the general “best interests” test, 
PETER N. SWISHER ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1169–70 
(1998); (5) the “approximation” standard adopted by chapter 2, and recently by West Vir-
ginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-11-206(a) (1999) (requiring courts to “allocate custodial re-
sponsibility so that the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent ap-
proximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the 
child prior to the parents’ separation”); (6) a presumption against awarding custody to a parent 
who has engaged in domestic abuse, see, e.g., In re Heather, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315 (1996); (7) 
a presumption against awarding custody to a parent involved in acts considered to involve 
moral turpitude, especially sexual promiscuity or homosexuality, see Linda D. Elrod et al., A 
Review of the Year in Family Law: Children’s Issues Dominate, 32 FAM. L.Q. 661, 682–84 
(1999); and (8) a presumption in favor of parents who show the “ability . . . to allow an open 
and loving frequent relationship between the child and the other parent,” ALASKA STAT. § 
25.24.150(c)(6) (2000). For a recent overview of state statutes and the factors they list for 
custody determinations, see Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in 
Family Law: A Search for Definitions and Policy, 31 FAM. L.Q. 613, 661 (1998). 
 4. Indeed, in announcing final adoption of the Principles, the ALI itself referred to the 
“controversial chapters on domestic partners and on the effect to be accorded prior agreements 
between the partners upon dissolution of their relationship.” Institute Gives Final Approval to 
Family Dissolution and Transnational Insolvency Projects, A.L.I. REP. (Summer 2000), avail-
able at http://www.ali.org (last visited Jan. 3, 2001). Because of the interaction of the domes-
tic partnership proposals in Principles with those regarding child custody, see infra notes 42–68 
and accompanying text, this paper argues that the controversy is warranted. 
 5. Chapter 2 appeared in original, tentative form in PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 
3, pt. I), supra note 2, with additions and revisions to the sections of most relevance here in 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2. All citations of sections of chapter 2 will be 
to their appearance in PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4) unless otherwise noted. 
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ent—the “de facto parent.” Outside intact biological families—and 
occasionally even within them—this new legal term of art promises 
to have sweeping importance. De facto parenthood creates a new 
kind of “extended family” for children, one in which three, four, or 
more adults may have status as one type or another of rights-holding 
parent. As such, the concept deserves careful scrutiny—at first, as 
here, on its own terms and later in the full context of the contentious 
public debate over the extent to which traditional family structures 
must yield to new policy priorities and empirical understandings. 
This article will urge rejection of the de facto parenthood provi-
sions of chapter 2, while acknowledging that such informal caretak-
ing relationships can acquire serious, even fundamental importance 
for a child.6 Instead, it will examine the relationship between that 
category and what the drafters identify as the two central priorities of 
their enterprise: (1) “to provide determinate and predictable out-
comes [in custody cases] that benefit children in the vast majority of 
cases,” and thus prevent “unnecessary litigation, the hiring of expen-
sive experts, and strategic or manipulative behavior by parents,”7 all 
while (2) serving the “individualized . . . interests of individual chil-
dren.”8 Part I will briefly describe the structure of chapter 2’s ap-
proach to allocations of “custodial responsibility” over children. Part 
II will outline the importance, recognized by the drafters, of limita-
tions on standing in disputes over children and examine the structure 
of section 2.04, which essentially limits standing to persons fitting 
into one of the defined categories of “parent,” including “de facto 
parent,” in section 2.03. Part III will examine section 2.03’s defini-
tion of “de facto parent” and argue that its indeterminacy creates an 
enormous potential for manipulative litigation, unfair bargaining, 
and interference with parent-child relationships—especially in con-
 
 6. The most influential, early explication of the theory of nonexclusive parenthood on 
the concept of de facto parenthood is found in Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood 
as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Fam-
ily Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984). See also Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Fam-
ily or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-
Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045 (1996); John DeWitt Gregory, Blood 
Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 
(1998); Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALI Princi-
ples, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769 (1999). 
 7. Katharine T. Bartlett, Reporter’s Memorandum to the Members of the Institute, 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 22, at xxiii. 
 8. Id., Introduction, at 1. 
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junction with the principles of chapter 69 regarding domestic part-
ners. Part IV will briefly contrast the broad new custodial privileges 
chapter 2 proposes granting to “de facto” parents with the sharp cur-
tailment it would impose on the rights of the biological extended 
family, especially grandparents—despite what seem to be that latter 
group’s smaller (or even nonexistent) incentives to engage in strate-
gic use of child custody litigation. Finally, Part V will question the 
reasonableness of the exclusion in section 2.04 of standing for chil-
dren themselves in the process of determining which relationships 
will benefit them as they grow toward their own autonomy, and 
suggest that giving children standing in custody disputes to seek 
continued access to de facto parents and other adults would be a far 
less dangerous approach to preserving their extended “family” than 
that contained in chapter 2. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF CHAPTER 2’S CUSTODY RULES 
Chapter 2 seeks to establish “[p]rinciples governing the alloca-
tion of custodial and decisionmaking responsibility for a minor 
child” in all circumstances “when the [child’s] parents do not live 
together,” and in some when they do.10 Foremost among those prin-
ciples is the requirement that courts should honor parental agree-
ments concerning custody,11 which fits together with the general 
preference in the Principles for encouraging settlement of disputes 
through private agreement.12 Under section 2.07, a court is permit-
ted to reject a custody agreement only if it is “not knowing or volun-
tary” or “would be harmful to the child”—and then the court is re-
quired to give the parents another opportunity to negotiate an 
agreement.13 There is no requirement, moreover, that parents pro-
duce evidence of voluntary, good faith negotiation or of the agree-
 
 9. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, at 1–60. 
 10. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.01, at 17. Even if a 
child’s parents are living together, chapter 2 authorizes judicial intervention when “the circum-
stances underlying a child’s residence with a de facto parent substantially change.” Id. § 
2.01(2). For a discussion of the concept of “de facto” parenthood and its relationship to litiga-
tion over children, see infra text accompanying notes 27–67. 
 11. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.07, at 246–47. 
 12. Outside of the child custody area, the Principles require courts to honor private 
agreements, with strictly limited exceptions, regarding child support, id. § 3.11, property divi-
sion, id. § 4.01, compensatory payments, id. § 5.01, and premarital and marital agreements, id. 
§ 7.03. 
 13. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.07, at 246–47. 
8LOK.DOC 1/3/02  2:20 PM 
1045] New Extended Family 
 1049 
ment’s benefit for their child except where the court has somehow 
received “credible information” of domestic or child abuse.14 As the 
drafters admit, section 2.07 “requires greater deference” to custody 
agreements than does the prevailing law of most jurisdictions.15 
Where parents fail to agree, chapter 2 authorizes broad judicial 
involvement to establish and enforce a “parenting plan” for each 
child—that is, “an individualized and customized order” that speci-
fies “in some detail” the times when each parent will have responsi-
bility for the child and the allocation between the parents of author-
ity to make decisions on such matters as health care and education.16 
In a sharp break with current legal terminology, chapter 2 abandons 
all distinctions between “custody” and “visitation,” merging them 
into the term “custodial responsibility,”17 and so makes litigation 
over the parenting plan the sole forum for any disputes over claims 
to continuing contact with a child.18 
To achieve reasonably predictable results in disputes over custo-
dial allocations in the parenting plan, section 2.09 declares that “the 
court should be required to allocate custodial responsibility so that 
 
 14. Id. The court is permitted, “on any basis it deems sufficient,” to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing on the agreement’s compliance with the knowing, voluntary, and no-harm-to-
the-child standards, but such a hearing is mandatory only if “credible information” of either 
child abuse or domestic abuse is presented to the court. Id. § 2.07(2). In a comment, the 
drafters appear thoroughly reconciled to the prospect that very few evidentiary hearings will 
result from this grant of discretionary review, on the grounds that courts seldom have sufficient 
resources to conduct many such hearings and that such hearings are of dubious value outside 
cases of child or domestic abuse. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 
2.07 cmt. a, at 80–81. 
 15. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.07 cmt. a, at 80–81. 
The Reporter acknowledges that, in contrast to section 2.07, the “general rule is that courts 
are not bound by parental agreements regarding the custody of children, on the grounds that 
while parents can bargain [a]way their own rights, they cannot bargain away those of their 
children, which the court has an obligation to protect. Id. § 2.07 Reporter’s Notes cmt. a, at 
85. A recent study of actual outcomes in custody cases found that in 134 of the 705 cases 
where the parents appeared to agree on a custodial arrangement the decree provided for a dif-
ferent outcome. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: 
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 103 (1992). 
 16. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 8–9. The 
components of the “parenting plan” are set forth in section 2.06(3). Id. at 64–66. 
 17. Id. at 9. Thus, “custodial responsibility” is defined as “physical custodianship and 
supervision of a child,” which “usually includes, but does not necessarily require, residential or 
overnight responsibility.” Id. § 2.03(4), at 37–38. This article will follow that practice by using 
“custody” to encompass traditional rights to both custody and visitation. 
 18. Third parties can also apparently obtain custodial rights under a “parenting plan” to 
which all parents have agreed. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.07, at 
246–47. 
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the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent 
approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing 
caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents’ separa-
tion”19—called the “approximation standard” by Elizabeth Scott, 
who first proposed it in 1992.20 The approximation standard, ac-
cording to a comment to section 2.09, “assumes that the division of 
past caretaking functions correlates well with other factors associated 
with the child’s best interests, such as the quality of each parent’s 
emotional attachment to the child and the parents’ respective parent-
ing abilities,” and that such functions provide a “more objective” 
guide to judicial decision.21 Nevertheless, as “caretaking functions” 
are defined in chapter 2, they do not always easily admit of concrete 
determination. They include not merely functions, such as feeding 
and bathing, that “meet the daily physical needs of the child,” but 
also less tangible functions such as “direction of the child’s various 
developmental needs,” “discipline, instruction in manners,” and “the 
development and maintenance of appropriate interpersonal relation-
ships with peers, siblings, and adults.”22 As Professor Scott conceded 
while introducing the “approximation” concept, “[t]ranslating evi-
dence about past parental care and responsibility into a plan for fu-
ture custody will often be a formidable task that is prone to error.”23 
Moreover, this “objective” standard is nevertheless subject to a 
 
 19. Id. § 2.09(1), at 247. 
 20. Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. 
REV. 615, 630–43 (1992). 
 21. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.09 cmt. b, at 113. In 
contrast to chapter 2, however, Scott grounds her support for an “approximation” approach 
explicitly on the likelihood that it best reflects “the parents’ true preferences” for custody, 
which makes it “the best predictor of the future stability of custody arrangements.” Scott, su-
pra note 20, at 637. 
 22. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.03(6), at 38–39. This 
is not by any means intended as a criticism of the standards, which are far more specific than 
the traditional “best interests” approach, and which largely track the factors used in the “pri-
mary caretaker” standard first adopted by a court in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 
1981). They find support, too, in the theory of “psychological parenthood” first advanced by 
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in the 1970s. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD 11–13 (1996). For a discussion of the ways in which the chapter 2 standards 
are in tension with the original theory of “psychological parenthood,” see infra text accompa-
nying notes 74–77. 
 23. Scott, supra note 20, at 639. Scott also acknowledges the possibility of “predivorce 
behavioral effects” of an approximation standard, caused by parents contemplating divorce de-
ciding to “behave in a way that exaggerates their participation in their child’s life.” Id. at 639 
n.75. 
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series of exceptions that vary widely in their potential to affect pre-
dictable decision making—ranging on the one hand from recogni-
tion of written post-separation agreements and deference to “the 
firm and reasonable preferences of a child who has reached a [legally 
specified] age” to, on the other, avoidance of “extremely impracti-
cal” allocations or adjustments in custodial allocations to reflect “a 
gross disparity in the quality of the emotional attachment between 
each parent and the child.”24 Finally, and perhaps most dangerous of 
all to the quest for objectivity, the parenting plan must ultimately 
“permit the child to have a relationship with each parent.”25 What, 
for example, does “relationship” mean? Is it to be the subject of (of-
ten conflicting) expert testimony? 
II. STANDING UNDER CHAPTER 2 
Even the best standards for allocating custody, though, can be 
manipulated in litigation, and the last decade has brought increasing 
recognition of the role that standing plays in protecting crucial fam-
ily interests.26 Liberal standing rules encourage, or at least tolerate, 
 
 24. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.09(1), at 248. Exceptions to 
the past caretaking standard are also provided to “keep siblings together when . . . necessary to 
their welfare,” to recognize preseparation agreements “that would be appropriate to consider 
in light of the circumstances as a whole,” to remedy “gross disparit[ies]” in “each parent’s 
demonstrated ability or availability to meet the child’s needs,” to accommodate a parental relo-
cation, and “to avoid substantial and almost certain harm to the child.” Id. at 248–49. 
 25. With respect to a “legal parent or a parent by estoppel who has performed a reason-
able share of parenting functions,” the parenting plan must presumptively provide each such 
parent a share of custodial time at least equal to a statewide minimum standard. Id. 
 26. See, e.g., Catherine Bostock, Does the Expansion of Grandparent Visitation Rights 
Promote the Best Interests of the Child?: A Survey of Grandparent Visitation Laws in the Fifty 
States, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 319, 365–69 (1994) (arguing that visitation standards 
are a separate question from questions of standing); Lawrence Schlam, Third-Party Standing in 
Child Custody Disputes: Will Kentucky’s New “De Facto Guardian” Provision Help?, 27 N. 
KY. L. REV. 368, 405 (2000) (arguing for “child-oriented” approach to third-party standing); 
see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be ‘so disruptive of the parent-
child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make basic determina-
tions for the child’s welfare becomes implicated,’” (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 101 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting))); Castagno v. Wholean, 684 A.2d 1181 (Conn. 1996) (construing open-
ended visitation statute to require prior family disruption before third parties have standing to 
seek visitation). In many ways, the most powerful statement of the dangers posed by indeter-
minate standing requirements in custody actions remains. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 
359–62 (W. Va. 1981) (noting that “it is likely that the primary caretaker will have less finan-
cial security than the nonprimary caretaker and, consequently, will be unable to sustain the 
expense of custody litigation”). 
8LOK.DOC 1/3/02  2:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1052 
more frequent litigation, and as Catherine Bostock has explained, 
custodial litigation may directly harm children by exposing them to 
acrimony, stress, and conflicts of loyalty—as well as the danger of bi-
ased or subjective decision making under vague standards.27 For the 
custodial parent forced to defend an action for custody, such a suit 
means heavy distraction and significant costs.28 Thus, the custodial 
mother in Troxel v. Granville29 had to hire two expert witnesses in 
defending against the grandparents’ visitation petition,30 and ulti-
mately had to file an affidavit of “financial need” to seek reimburse-
ment of her attorney’s fees.31 Commentators have long recognized 
the ugly possibility that, in the face of such costs, a parent might feel 
constrained to make concessions in the division of marital property 
or child support in order to avoid the risk of losing custody rights.32 
 
 27. Bostock, supra note 26, at 365–68. While the standards of chapter 2 certainly are 
more definite than the traditional “best interests” standard to which Bostock referred, the 
drafters seem freely to acknowledge that some custodial disputes are bound—even under the 
new standards—to have “poor” results. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 
2, Introduction, at 16. 
 28. Thus, in a 1988 survey, Donald H. Stone documented that the median attorney’s 
fee for representation of a parent in a contested child custody case was in excess of $3000. Just 
Molly and Me and Baby Makes Three—Or Does It? Child Custody and the Live-In Lover: An 
Empirical Study, 11 PACE L. REV. 1, 49–51 (1990). Expert testimony, so integral to contest-
ing many elements of a custody claim, significantly adds to the expense. 
 29. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 30. In re Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 699 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
 31. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (Wash. 1998), aff’d, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) 
(remanding for consideration of the application). See also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, 
J., plurality opinion) (noting that “the litigation costs incurred by Granville on her trip 
through the Washington court system and to this Court are without a doubt already substan-
tial”). 
 32. The potential for such tradeoffs was first shown in Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 
(1979). The dangers of strategic use of custody rules to disadvantage the parent with the 
strongest interest in keeping custody was more specifically developed in Scott, supra note 20, 
at 643–56, which relies on the insights of game theory. The Reporter for chapter 2 acknowl-
edges this “concern” and cites a survey of attorneys in which almost half acknowledged that 
they had “represented female clients who conceded property rights in order to avoid a child-
custody dispute.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.07, Reporter’s 
Notes cmt. a, at 85. To be sure, one important California study found no evidence of tradeoffs 
between custody arrangements and child support awards. MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 
15, at 154–59. Yet, that study does little to undermine the general perception that custody 
tradeoffs exist, for they would be far more likely to affect marital property and alimony awards 
than child support amounts—which are generally subject, as in California, to rigid statewide 
formulas. See id. at 157 (citing child support schedules as “likely” explanation for lack of evi-
dence of strategic behavior). See also Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender, and the 
Limits of Law: On Dividing the Child, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1808, 1838 (1994) (arguing that 
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Chapter 2 attempts to address these concerns in section 2.04, 
which establishes the boundaries of standing to initiate and to inter-
vene in actions over custodial responsibility. Standing to initiate an 
action is limited to a “legal parent,” a “parent by estoppel,” a “de 
facto parent,” a “biological parent” who is no longer a “legal parent” 
but who has reserved some parental rights under an agreement with 
a “legal parent,” and any person previously given responsibility for 
the child under an existing court-approved parenting plan.33 As will 
be explained in the next section,34 all of these labels for “parent” are 
terms of art carefully defined by section 2.03. Standing to intervene 
in an already-initiated action is limited to those various types of “par-
ents,” and to other individuals or public agencies, “[i]n exceptional 
cases” if the court determines the intervention is “likely to serve the 
child’s best interests.”35 
As will shortly appear, this approach to standing represents at 
once a dramatic expansion and a sharp contraction of existing stand-
ing rights in child custody cases. Stepparents, live-in sexual partners, 
and even roommates may be able plausibly to advance claims to “de 
facto” parenthood that will permit them to initiate custody litigation 
with a natural parent. Moreover, because of the presumption that 
custodial allocations will substantially mirror prior caretaking behav-
ior, these putative “de facto” parents will have standing to pursue 
not just classic visitation rights, but virtually coequal physical cus-
tody. On the other hand, grandparents, who have won the right in 
virtually every state to petition for visitation at least under some 
circumstances,36 would be precluded from initiating such a 
proceeding in court and would be able to intervene in ongoing 
custody proceedings only in “exceptional cases.” That these 
procedural changes are bold, even momentous, is hardly in doubt. 
Whether they are consistent with the central purposes of standing 
requirements—protection both of children and of legitimate interests 
in family autonomy—is an entirely different matter. 
 
the Maccoby & Mnookin study does not contradict the notion that “bargaining in the shadow 
of the law” characterizes marital dissolutions). 
 33. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.04(1), at 232–33. 
 34. See infra text accompanying notes 40–53. 
 35. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.04(2), at 233. 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 67–90. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 
(2000) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). For an overview and analysis of the statutes, see 
Bostock, supra note 26, at 331–47. 
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III. STANDING AND THE NEW EXTENDED FAMILY 
One of the most appealing features of chapter 2 is that it recog-
nizes, both in principle and in concrete application, the quite incon-
trovertible fact of modern life that “children are often cared for by 
adults who play very significant roles without replacing their legal 
parents.”37 Just so the Supreme Court plurality in Troxel v. Granville 
described the “changing realities of the American family” in which 
“grandparents and other relatives undertake duties of a parental na-
ture” and state laws attempt to “ensure the welfare of the children 
[in such households] . . . by protecting the relationships those chil-
dren form with such third parties.”38 In that case, a clear majority of 
the Court seemed to suggest that states may constitutionally grant 
legal protection to such relationships—through, for example, care-
fully limited grandparent visitation statutes—even over parental ob-
jections.39 
Even against this background, though, chapter 2’s protection of 
third-party rights in children is strikingly broad. For, as the term 
“parent” is defined in section 2.03, it includes not only a “legal par-
ent” (that is, a person holding parental status on traditionally recog-
nized grounds),40 but also a “parent by estoppel”41 and a “de facto 
 
 37. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 6. 
 38. 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). Fully 5.5% of children 
were living with grandparents, most of them in grandparent-supported homes, in 1997, up 
from 3.2% in 1970. KEN BRYSON & LYNNE M. CASPER, CENSUS BUR., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, CORESIDENT GRANDPARENTS AND GRANDCHILDREN 1–3, P23–198 (1999). 
 39. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (noting that “we would be hesitant to hold that specific 
nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter”), id. at 88 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “children have . . . interests” in “family-like bonds” with 
nonparents that must be “balanced in the equation”), id. at 100–01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(arguing against facial invalidation of visitation statute, and concluding, “in short, a fit parent’s 
right vis-à-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-à-vis another parent or a de facto 
parent may be another”). 
 40. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.03(1)(a), at 201–03 (defin-
ing a “legal parent” as “an individual who is defined as a parent under other state law”) To this 
reader, the use of the term “legal parent” seems to invite unnecessary confusion, since chapter 
2 proposes to give powerful “legal” status to “parent[s] by estoppel” and “de facto” parents as 
well as “legal” parents. 
 41. Id. § 2.03(1)(b), at 201–02 (defining a “parent by estoppel” to be, in summary, an 
individual who has been induced to believe in his paternity through representations of the 
mother and assumed parental responsibilities in reliance on that belief, or an individual who 
assumed “full and permanent” parental responsibilities for a child, including child support, 
pursuant to an agreement with the child’s legal parents and lived with the child for a significant 
period). 
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parent.”42 Each of these additions proposes an extraordinary shift in 
legal paradigms of parenthood,43 but because the “de facto” parent-
hood category is of most practical relevance in debating the scope of 
standing in child custody litigation,44 it is that category which war-
rants immediate attention here. 
A. Defining “De Facto” Parenthood 
From the perspective of litigation, chapter 2 defines “de facto 
parent”45 to establish four elements for an individual plausibly to 
claim such status as against a biological or other “legal” parent: (1) 
residence with a child for at least two years, (2) a motivation “pri-
marily other than financial compensation,” (3) either “the agreement 
of a legal parent” or the “complete failure . . . of any legal parent to 
perform caretaking functions,”46 and (4) having “regularly per-
 
 42. Id. § 2.03(1)(c), at 202–03. 
 43. Thus, it is plain from the text and commentary to sections 2.03 and 2.21 that chap-
ter 2 contemplates the possibility that children will have three, four, or even more “parents.” 
See, e.g., id. § 2.21 cmt. b, illus. 4, at 257–58 (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 64–
65). This is in sharp contrast with what the drafter of chapter 2 earlier recognized as the “ex-
clusive status” of parenthood, accepted in the American legal tradition “with few exceptions,” 
in which at most two adults could share at any one time. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 879–86. 
 44. It is of course true that a “parent by estoppel” has standing to litigate custody with a 
biological parent, PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.04(b), at 232, but 
many persons fitting that definition, especially husbands of women who conceive a child ex-
tramaritally, already have such standing, see CAL. FAM. CODE. § 7551 (West 1997) (granting 
putative fathers limited right to seek blood tests to prove paternity), and in any case, a natural 
parent who has defrauded another into believing in his parenthood, or who has formally 
agreed to accept co-parenting with another, is hardly an attractive target for sympathy in facing 
subsequent litigation costs and anxieties. 
 45. Chapter 2 defines a de facto parent to be: 
an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant 
period of time not less than two years, 
(i) lived with the child and, 
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement 
of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete fail-
ure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions, 
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or 
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as that of the 
parent with whom the child primarily lived. 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.03(c), at 202–03. 
 46. Id. The use of “any” in this last phrase seems to this reader needlessly ambiguous. 
Does it mean that where “any” one of the child’s biological parents had abandoned her, a 
claimant to de facto parenthood living with the deserted, functioning parent could dispense 
with the need to show that that parent had agreed to the formation of a parent-child relation-
ship? Comment c(iii) to section 2.03 describes the section as permitting de facto status in the 
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formed a share of caretaking functions at least [equal to] . . . that of 
the parent with whom the child primarily lived.”47 A comment to 
section 2.03 describes these requirements as “strict, to avoid unnec-
essary and inappropriate intrusion into the relationships between le-
gal parents and their children.”48 
But how strict are they really, especially when considered in the 
context of standing, prior to all the litigation costs and strains that 
can so burden parental autonomy? When sections 2.03 and 2.04 are 
read together, they seem to open the courthouse door to custodial 
claims to de facto parenthood by a broad array of people who have 
cared for, or lived in the same household with, a child. Most cru-
cially, absent clear evidence of a “primarily” financial motive,49 any-
one who shared the same household with a biological parent and her 
child for a period longer than two years would almost certainly be 
able to threaten a suit for partial custody that would survive a motion 
to dismiss, or even summary judgment. The necessary vagueness in 
the description of many of the “caretaking functions,”50 combined 
with the vagaries of witnesses and judges, would force any such bio-
logical parent to take the threat of such litigation very seriously. 
Even the requirement that the applicant for “de facto” parent-
hood show “the agreement of a legal parent”51 will do little to screen 
claims at the level of standing. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to 
parents by estoppel, who must show that they assumed a parental 
role pursuant to an agreement with both legal parents (if there are 
 
absence of an agreement only “when there has been a total failure or inability by the legal par-
ent to care for the child.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, at 223 (emphasis 
added). However, this does not clearly explain what happens when there are two legal parents. 
 47. Id. § 2.03(c), at 202–03. 
 48. Id. § 2.03 cmt. c, at 219; cf. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 776–82 (arguing that chapter 
2’s de facto parenthood standards are too strict because they will “exclude many, if not most, 
stepparents” and many lesbian and gay parents). 
 49. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.03(c)(ii), at 202–03. Many 
paid residential caretakers—such as classic “nannies”—would be excluded from standing under 
the test of “reasons primarily other than financial compensation.” Id. But relatives or close 
friends who care for a child, even if paid, might plausibly argue that their motivation was not 
“primarily” financial. Moreover, roommates whose basis for a relationship with a parent is pri-
marily financial (e.g., rent sharing) might persuasively argue that later they undertook care of 
the parent’s child out of kindness or fondness, not for financial reasons. In any event, if it is 
protection of the child’s crucial relationships that is at the heart of the de facto parenthood 
proposals, it is difficult to understand this “financial reasons” exception—for how many small 
children know or understand the difference between paid and unpaid care? 
 50. See supra text accompanying notes 21–22. 
 51. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.03(c)(ii), at 202. 
8LOK.DOC 1/3/02  2:20 PM 
1045] New Extended Family 
 1057 
two),52 de facto claimants need only show the consent of one. Fur-
ther, that agreement, according to the comment, “may be implied by 
the circumstances,” and the requirement is meant only to screen out 
relationships that arise “by accident, in secrecy, or as a result of im-
proper behavior.”53 Biological parents who choose to live with their 
children in the same household with other adults may very well find 
themselves saddled with co-parenting relationships they never fully 
anticipated. 
That both stepparents and “domestic partners” as defined in 
chapter 654 would frequently qualify for status as de facto parents is a 
fact which the comments and illustrations to chapter 2 make very 
clear.55 Indeed, the “joint assumption of parental functions toward a 
child” is one of the key indicators under chapter 6 as to whether a 
couple “shared life together” and so qualified as “domestic part-
ners.”56 Any litigant seeking a property settlement under chapter 6 
would thus have every incentive to make allegations that would coin-
cidentally support a claim for de facto parenthood and custodial 
rights. It is one of the remarkable oddities of the Principles that the 
drafters suggest a “cohabitation period” of three years for a pre-
sumption of domestic partnership to arise,57 but set a minimum of 
only two years for a claimant to de facto parenthood of another’s 
child58—without any explanation as to why a housemate should be 
enabled more easily to intrude on the parent-child relationship than 
on the property interests of a biological parent.59 
 
 52. Id. at 201–02. Thus, a noncustodial biological father “who acknowledges the stepfa-
ther’s role but who continues to exercise his own parental rights and responsibilities has not 
agreed to the formation of a parent [by estoppel] status by the stepfather.” Id. § 2.03 cmt. 
b(iv), at 216. 
 53. Id. § 2.03 cmt. c(iii), at 223. Nor, it appears, must the claimant show a specific 
agreement by the biological parent to assuming the legally protected role of “de facto parent,” 
but only that the “relationship to the child has arisen with knowledge and agreement of the 
legal parent.” Id. 
 54. Id. § 6.03, at 14–49. 
 55. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.03 cmt. b(iii), illus. 
9, at 44–45 (committed same-sex relationship); PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra 
note 2, § 2.21 cmt. b, illus. 1, at 255 (stepparent). 
 56. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 6.03(7)(l), at 14–17. 
 57. Id. § 6.03 cmt. d, at 21–23. 
 58. Id. § 2.03(c), at 202. 
 59. While of course this distinction might be justified on the ground that protecting 
children’s relationship interests is more important than a partner’s property interests, or that a 
child’s sense of time is different, it nevertheless creates seriously perverse incentives for partners 
who have lived with a parent and child more than two, but less than three, years. Because 
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B. Empowering “De Facto” Parents. 
To make matters more frightening for the biological custodial 
parent, the extent of the custody claim that an ex-spouse or house-
mate can plausibly make goes far beyond traditional boundaries of 
visitation. For, in order to allege de facto parenthood, the former 
partner must allege that she shared at least equally in “caretaking 
functions.” But such an assertion in turn would support, under the 
qualified mirror-the-past allocation standard of section 2.09, a grant 
of almost half the custodial time to the “de facto” parent.60 Else-
where, in section 2.21, chapter 2 does establish a presumption that a 
biological parent should receive “the majority of custodial responsi-
bility” over a de facto parent, but then withholds the benefit of this 
rule in the rather easily litigated cases where the biological parent is 
unfit or “has not been performing a reasonable share of parenting 
functions,” or where the result would “cause harm to the child.”61 
And even with the full benefit of the presumption, the biological 
parent is apparently entitled only to a “majority” of custodial time—
which could mean custodial rights for the ex-housemate of forty-
nine percent. 
Likewise, for the biological parent who does not have primary 
custody of a child while the child’s other biological parent is living 
with a new partner, a claim for de facto parental status by the step-
parent or partner will carry severe risks of diminished access to the 
child. As noted above, upon dissolution of her second marriage the 
mother who already held primary custody can at least expect to re-
tain a “majority” of custodial responsibility. But no such protection 
exists in section 2.21 for the nonprimary custodial parent. Thus, the 
biological father might see his share of custodial responsibility cut in 
half to accommodate the new de facto parent.62 Thus, in one of the 
 
property division may not be sought directly, a “de facto” parent custody claim will be the sole 
leverage available to the partner as against the parent in seeking a voluntary settlement. 
 60. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.09(1), at 108. As noted 
above, see supra text accompanying note 17, chapter 2 would abolish all distinctions between 
rights to “custody” and to “visitation,” and the possibility of an award of nearly half of a 
child’s time to a de facto parent shows the significance of conflating the terms. See also infra 
text accompanying note 103 (discussing importance of ending distinction between custody 
and visitation with respect to rights of grandparents). 
 61. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.21(1)(a), at 252. See id. cmt. 
b, illus. 1, at 255 (stepparent could be allocated a “co-equal share” or a “smaller share” with 
biological parent after divorce). 
 62. See id. cmt. b, at 255–56. To cut down the rights of a biological parent under a 
8LOK.DOC 1/3/02  2:20 PM 
1045] New Extended Family 
 1059 
illustrations to section 2.21, a biological noncustodial father begins 
with one and one-half days per week of custodial responsibility after 
his divorce from the biological mother.63 After her marriage to a sec-
ond husband breaks up, the biological father and stepfather are allo-
cated alternating weekends, thus reducing the biological father’s cus-
todial time from about six to about four days per month.64 And this 
reduction may be repeated because chapter 2 places no absolute limit 
on the number of de facto parents a child can have, other than to say 
that an allocation of custodial rights to such a claimant should be 
denied when it “would be impractical in light of the objectives of 
this Chapter.”65 
The Reporter for chapter 2 acknowledges evidence supporting 
the “possibility of strategic behavior in requesting custody”66 and 
recognizes the insightful observation of the West Virginia Supreme 
Court in Garska v. McCoy that unpredictability in custody battles 
 
previously established “parenting plan” might seem to require satisfying section 2.18, which 
demands for modification of a plan the showing “that a substantial change has occurred in the 
circumstances of the child or of one or both parents” along with a showing “that a modifica-
tion is necessary to the child’s welfare.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 
2, § 2.18, at 310. Section 2.18 makes clear that a parent’s entry into marriage or cohabitation 
with a nonparent does not qualify as a “substantial change,” id. cmt. f, at 318, but whether 
divorce or separation from a stepparent or partner would qualify as such a change is not made 
clear. Yet this ambiguity may be unimportant because section 2.21 authorizes allocations of 
custodial responsibility to de facto parents without any reference to the modification standards 
of section 2.18. The most plausible reading of section 2.21, therefore, seems to make awards 
of custodial responsibility to de facto parents immune from the requirements normally associ-
ated with modifications. Cf. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.21 cmt. b, 
illus. 1, at 254–55 (making no reference to possible rights of biological mother in suggesting 
that stepmother may be allocated “co-equal” custody rights with biological father). 
 63. Id. § 2.21 cmt. b, illus. 4, at 257–58. 
 64. Id. The illustration does not indicate by what process this change in the biological 
father’s custodial rights occurred, so it need not necessarily be read to suggest that the father 
would have no right to fight for preservation of his full, previously established time. Nonethe-
less, given the difficulties of splitting custody among two, let alone three or more parties, while 
still preserving some stability in a child’s life, it does seem highly likely that the time allotted to 
the primary custodial parent (in this illustration “each weekday”) would remain fairly constant, 
while the minority of time given over to secondary custodians would be subdivided with each 
new participant. 
 65. Id. § 2.21(b), at 252. See also id. cmt. b, illus. 4, at 257–58 (noting that where a 
child already had two “legal” parents, one de facto parent exercising custodial responsibility, 
and a second de facto parent now making a claim to custody, a “court may determine that al-
locating custodial responsibility to four different adults now living in four different households 
is impractical and contrary to [the child’s] interests” (emphasis added)). 
 66. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.02, Reporter’s Notes 
cmt. c, at 32–33. 
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breeds the “irresistible temptation to trade the custody of the child 
in return for lower alimony and child support payments.”67 Yet the 
chapter’s recognition of broad standing rights for claimants to de 
facto parenthood, combined with the substantial widening of the 
range of potential claims for property in chapters 4, 5, and 6, threat-
ens just this kind of poisonous strategizing. Why not suggest, in ne-
gotiations over property or compensatory payments, that the former 
stepparent or roommate is seriously considering a custody claim? Just 
the fear of protracted litigation—not to mention the vastly height-
ened potential for losing exclusive custody at the end—may well be 
enough to lubricate agreement on other issues. Even the other bio-
logical parent, the one not involved in the dissolution, may be forced 
to consider trading off some financial contribution to the dissolving 
partners in order to preserve the full extent of her custodial privi-
leges—or worse, to consider resorting to expensive and harmful liti-
gation to challenge the de facto parent’s claim. To make matters 
worse, the strong deference that chapter 2 imposes on courts with 
respect to parental agreements68 means that strategic behavior is even 
more likely than under current law to go undetected by the court is-
suing the final decree.69 
For the ex-partner of a biological parent, then, the benefits of 
bringing a plausible claim to de facto parenthood will be tempting, 
and, as it turns out, the costs will be minimal. That is because chap-
ter 3 of the Principles imposes no child support obligation whatso-
ever on de facto parents, which is in sharp contrast with its full impo-
sition of such an obligation on all biological parents and “parents by 
estoppel.”70 A successful de facto claimant could thus achieve the 
 
 67. 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981), cited in PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.02, Reporter’s Notes cmt. c, at 32. For a fuller development of this 
problem, see Scott, supra note 20, at 643–56. 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 11–15. 
 69. While section 2.07(1)(a) does allow a court to refuse to enforce an agreement if it is 
“not knowing or voluntary,” the section appears strongly to discourage routine evidentiary 
inquiries on that subject. See supra text accompanying notes 11–15. Indeed, it is difficult to 
see how a parent forced to concede property rights to keep custody would gain much by ex-
posing the other party’s strategic behavior to the court because such behavior is not one of the 
factors that a court is permitted to take into account in allocating custodial responsibility under 
section 2.09(1). PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.09(1), at 247–50. Per-
haps of some concern, too, is the use of the conjunction “or” instead of “and” between 
“knowing” and “voluntary” in section 2.07; need only one of those two mental states be 
shown? 
 70. Id. §§ 3.01A–3.02A, at 277–96. Strangely, and perhaps because the final revised 
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right to have custody of the child nearly half the time with no danger 
of facing a child support award. In cases where a de facto claimant 
has higher income than the biological parent, this would provide a 
particularly lucrative shield against the substantial support award he 
would face under the income formula approach of chapter 3.71 Step-
parents and partners with greater resources than the biological parent 
are thus free to exploit all the advantages such resources give to liti-
gants, with no concern about facing a long-term financial obligation 
to the child caught in the middle.72 Finally, the disparity of support 
obligations between de facto parents and parents by estoppel might 
well have the unfortunate unintended consequence of discouraging 
parties from seeking the latter status, which involves taking full re-
sponsibility for the child.73 Because of the substantial overlap in 
qualifications between the two categories,74 why not instead seek the 
free ride of de facto parenthood? 
All these practical concerns with the combined effect of chapter 
2’s standing and de facto parenthood provisions might seem toler-
able if, in the clear majority of cases, children were likely to benefit 
from them. But, of course, if de facto parenthood claims are fre-
quently made only as threats to cow a biological parent into a favor-
able dissolution settlement, children will receive only a lower stan-
 
version has yet to be published, the comments to these sections do not clearly cross-reference 
the de facto parenthood provisions of chapter 2. Still, they make it clear that a “caretaker,” 
even one who has “primary residential responsibility” for a child, “ordinarily has no duty to 
support the child.” Id. § 3.02 cmt. g, at 281. This becomes stranger still given the commit-
ment of chapter 3, in the words of its reporter, to “treat[] each parent as both a payor and a 
payee of child support,” with support obligations linked to the amount of time a child resides 
with each parent. Grace Ganz Blumberg, Balancing the Interests: The American Law Insti-
tute’s Treatment of Child Support, 33 FAM. L. Q. 39, 83–84 (1999); see also PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 
3, pt. II, 1998) § 3.14 cmt. f, at 115 [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. II)] 
(“The logic of child support calculation under . . . the ALI formula . . . requires that total child 
expenditure be calculated and then apportioned between the parties according to their respec-
tive percentages of residential responsibility.”). 
 71. Chapter 3 calls for adoption of a child support formula that tends to equalize the 
incomes of the two parties. Id. § 3.05 cmt. b, at 24–26. Even in cases where parents are shar-
ing equal residential responsibility, one may still have to pay support to the other to equalize 
the child’s standard of living in the two residences. Id. § 3.14(3), at 311; id. § 3.14 cmt. f, at 
115–16. 
 72. This is a more severe version of the problem created by grandparent visitation suits 
where “parents lose power and gain no right to support.” Bostock, supra note 26, at 321. 
 73. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. II), supra note 70, § 3.02A, at 282–83. 
 74. Compare PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.03(b), with 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.03(c). 
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dard of living while gaining no continued contact with the former 
stepparent or domestic partner. The very use of such a threat, in-
deed, might be expected to lead a biological parent who had been 
forced into such a trade-off to cut off, as much as possible, all future 
contact between the child and the former spouse. 
And while it is beyond the scope of this article to debate the the-
ory of de facto parenthood on which these portions of chapter 2 rest, 
it is at least important to note that the concept is not one that has 
been established with any clear degree of scientific certainty or judi-
cial consensus. It builds, of course, on the notion of “psychological 
parent” developed by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in the 1970s, but 
goes far beyond it.75 For Goldstein and his colleagues explicitly de-
clared, then and subsequently, that when two “parents” of a child 
divorce or separate, “[t]he noncustodial parent should have no le-
gally enforceable right to visit the child . . . .”76 In her scholarship, 
Professor Bartlett, the Reporter for chapter 2, has of course acknowl-
edged both this primary debt and this last disagreement, and has 
provided powerful arguments for the contrary view.77 Still, empirical 
support for either view must be regarded as thin, and chapter 2 cites 
virtually none in support of its sweeping proposal to  
give custodial standing to stepparents or partners who have  
resided with a child for as little as two years.78  
 
 75. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 9–28 
(1979). Goldstein and his colleagues identified, as a particularly important example of a “psy-
chological parent,” situations where “a parent, without resort to any legal process, leaves his or 
her child with a friend or relative for an extended period of time.” Id. at 27. At no point in 
their account, even as revised in the mid-1990s, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 22, at 8–16, do 
they suggest that a “psychological parent” relationship will arise when a biological parent 
shares living quarters with a stepparent or domestic partner. 
 76. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 75, at 37–39; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 22, at 23–27 
(reaffirming and explaining previous view). 
 77. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 944–61. In her view favoring a “non-exclusive” approach 
to parenthood, of course, Professor Bartlett has received substantial support from commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 957 (1999) (reviewing interdependency theory and its inconsistency with traditional 
notions of exclusive parenthood); Kaas, supra note 6, at 1094–95 (proposing a statute that 
would give partners with whom a biological parent had “created a family” equal preference to 
custody of a child). My own scholarship supports some legal recognition of the rights of ado-
lescents to maintenance of adult relationships beyond the nuclear family but would not 
necessarily limit such recognition to situations where the adult had lived with the adolescent. 
Gregory A. Loken, “Thrownaway” Children and Throwaway Parenthood, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 
1715, 1754–59 (1995). 
 78. Chapter 2’s introduction devotes less than two pages to the issue, and cites only the 
Reporter’s own scholarship published in 1984. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), su-
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Case support is equally thin.79 Indeed, cases that have persuasively 
used a “psychological parent” approach to give a third party visita-
tion or custody have often involved such clear-cut parental default, 
or such a clear prior agreement by the parent to give near-exclusive 
parental status to the third party, that they would fall into the cate-
gory of parent by estoppel as defined by chapter 2.80 
There is, then, much to lose in the formulation of de facto par-
enthood provided by chapter 2, while the extent of the gain is highly 
contestable. What is gained in predictability through adoption of the 
“approximation” standard is lost through expansion of the number 
of potential claimants. Opportunities and, more importantly, incen-
tives for abuse of such custody claims are enormous, and the threat 
to the security of parent-child relationships—especially those be-
tween children and their noncustodial biological parents—is severe. 
It seems fair, in the end, to call this proposal radical, even coura-
geous, and to believe at the same time that the change it promises is 
anything but progressive. 
 
pra note 2, Introduction, at 6–7. In a recent article, Karen Czapinskiy found that only eight 
states have legislation that explicitly authorizes stepparent visitation. Czapanskiy, supra note 
77, at 969 n.23. 
 79. Only one case, In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), is cited, 
and the Reporter’s Note concedes that its approach to de facto parenthood only “approxi-
mates” that of chapter 2. That case, in fact, authorized only visitation rights for the former 
partner, and specifically rejected a claim for substantial custody such as is provided for “de 
facto” parents in chapter 2. Id. at 423. Because the child was the product of artificial insemina-
tion, id. at 421, that case did not involve questions of how to preserve the custodial interests of 
the biological father. See supra text accompanying notes 61–65. There is, of course, very sub-
stantial, even a clear majority of, authority contrary to chapter 2’s position on this point. See, 
e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (denying claim of standing to seek 
visitation made by natural mother’s lesbian companion who shared custodial responsibilities for 
child for over two years, and whom the child called “Mommy”); Margaret M. Mahoney, Sup-
port and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38, 60–
71 (1984) (reviewing traditional refusal of law to give ongoing custodial or visitation rights to 
stepparents after divorce). But see A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), cert. 
denied, 827 P.2d 837 (N.M. 1992) (granting former lesbian partner standing to pursue cus-
tody and visitation). 
 80. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976) (child left with caretaker 
right after birth for several years); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 430 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) 
(child had lived exclusively with maternal grandparents for significant period of time after 
mother had been murdered). Because the parent by estoppel provisions were only added in the 
last draft of chapter 2, it is possible that the drafters were unable to give adequate reflection as 
to how the availability of this status might diminish the need for a separate de facto status. 
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IV. GRANDPARENTS AND STANDING UNDER CHAPTER 2 
Yet, however daring chapter 2 may appear in what it overtly pro-
poses regarding the custodial rights of stepparents and partners, its 
silence in another area is even more startling. For, without ever 
clearly saying that it is doing so, and without justifying its approach, 
chapter 2 would apparently sweep away the standing of grandpar-
ents, recognized in virtually every state,81 to petition the court for 
visitation with their grandchildren whenever both of the child’s par-
ents are alive but not living together. Again substantive debate over 
the underlying policy choice of the drafters is beyond the reach of 
this article, but when the resulting positions of the “new” and the 
biological extended families are compared, the coherence of chapter 
2’s overall approach to custody seems seriously compromised. 
An early comment in chapter 2 appears ready to dodge the issue 
of grandparent visitation altogether, by declaring that the chapter 
“does not cover challenges by third parties to the authority of legal 
parents living together, or to the authority of . . . the child’s only 
parent.”82 Thus, as an illustration makes plain, its provisions are 
inapplicable to one of the usual situations in which grandparents seek 
visitation—when one of the child’s parents has died.83 Nor would 
chapter 2 be applicable to support or deny a grandparent’s claim to 
visitation against “two parents living together.84 On the strength of 
the inapplicability of its provisions to the “intact one- or two-parent 
family,” the comment provides the rather tepid assurance that 
“‘[g]randparent visitation’ is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
provisions of chapter 2.”85 
 
 81. See Czapanskiy, supra note 77, at 968 n.22 (citing legislation in forty-nine states 
that provides for grandparent visitation); Elrod & Spector, supra note 3, at 665 (tbl. 6) (same, 
with forty-nine states providing specifically for grandparent visitation in cases involving divorce 
of grandchild’s parents); see also Castagno v. Wholean, 684 A.2d 1181, 1185 n.4 (Conn. 
1996) (reviewing state statutes and finding that “the majority specifically requires that certain 
threshold conditions be present before a grandparent may seek court intervention,” with virtu-
ally all statutes covering cases of dissolution of marriage). For a careful overview and analysis of 
the statutes, see Bostock, supra note 26, at 331–41. Several European countries recognize 
grandparent visitation rights, but the European Court of Human Rights recognizes them in 
only limited circumstances. See Christa Wiertz-Wezenbeek, Visitation Rights of Nonparents 
and Children in England and the Netherlands, 31 FAM. L.Q. 355 (1997). 
 82. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.01 cmt. b, at 18. 
 83. Id. § 2.01 cmt. b, illus. 3., at 19. 
 84. Id. § 2.01 cmt. b, illus. 1, at 18–19. 
 85. Id. § 2.01 cmt. b, at 18. 
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Only short reflection, though, reveals that this concession is of 
very limited value. For most states do not in fact permit grandparents 
to sue for visitation as against intact two-parent families.86 In addi-
tion, several state courts have declared unconstitutional visitation 
statutes that permit interference with an intact family.87 It is true, of 
course, that grandparents typically do have standing to seek visitation 
after the death of a parent, but it is also true that children living with 
a widowed parent are far fewer in number than those living with a 
divorced, separated, or never-married parent.88 And it is equally clear 
that chapter 2 does cover all visitation claims in the context of disso-
lution of a marriage or domestic partnership, or indeed in any con-
text where both parents are alive but not living together89—
situations which most grandparent visitation statutes do cover.  
Section 2.04’s standing provisions do not mention grandparents 
or biological extended family members at all, but instead simply limit 
the right to petition for custodial allocation to the three varieties of 
“parent” described above.90 A grandmother who could show that she 
had lived with a child for at least two years and had shared at least 
equal caretaking responsibility with a parent during that period could 
of course petition, like a stepparent, for de facto parental status. 
Otherwise, though, she would simply be one of the “other individu-
als” who may be permitted to intervene in dissolution actions already 
begun—and then only in “exceptional cases.”91 The term “excep-
 
 86. Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interde-
pendency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1334 (1994). 
 87. See, e.g., Hoff v. Berg, 199 ND 115, 595 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1999) (declaring 
grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional because of statutory presumption in favor of 
visitation); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 942 
(1995) (declaring grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional except where “harm” to child 
can be shown from denial of visitation); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) 
(same). 
 88. As of March 1998 there were 2,757,000 children living with a widowed parent,  
compared with 16,264,000 living with a divorced, separated, or never-married parent. CENSUS 
BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT P20-515, tbl. 10 
(Mar. 1998) available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p20-515u.pdf (visited Jan. 
24, 2001). 
 89. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.01 cmt. b, at 18; 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.04 cmt. g, illus. 9, at 241. 
 90. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.04(1), at 232–33. 
 91. Id. § 2.04(2), at 233; see id. § 2.04 cmt. g, at 240–41. Intervention is only permit-
ted if that will “serve the child’s best interests.” Id. § 2.04(2). Grandparents (and relatives) do 
receive some special mention later as third parties who may be allocated some custodial respon-
sibility if “a legal parent or parent by estoppel consents to the allocation.” Id. § 2.21(2), at 
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tional cases,” of course, is one that has been read very narrowly in 
custodial cases.92 
Most significantly, what about the common family situation in 
which the biological parents never formed a marriage or domestic 
partnership?93 These are circumstances in which grandparents fre-
quently play an extremely important role, but one that would fall 
short of de facto parenthood.94 In such cases, there will be no disso-
lution action in which a grandparent can intervene, and section 2.04 
could not be clearer in denying the right of such a nonparent to ini-
tiate an action.95 Why deny grandparents the right to seek visitation 
in circumstances of illegitimacy or divorce while leaving the visitation 
right intact for bereavement?96 Isn’t the grandparent arguably as im-
 
252–53. This amounts to very little, in part because of course such a parent could informally 
permit access to the child during her custodial periods, in part because it gives veto power to 
the other parent or parents, and finally because grandparents remain barred under section 2.04 
from petitioning a court for any access. 
 92. See, e.g., In re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122, 131–32 (N.Y. 1992) (refusing to apply 
“extraordinary circumstances” test in context of state foster care placement); Dickson v. Las-
caris, 423 N.E.2d 361, 363–64 (N.Y. 1981) (limiting concept to “narrow situations” such as 
“actual abandonment” of a child by a parent). All that chapter 2 offers to define “exceptional 
cases” is an illustration involving a dissolution in which the parents are “fighting over who 
should have primary custodial responsibility . . . [and] drawing the children into the conflict 
and attempting to enlist their support against one another,” in which case a grandparent could 
be permitted to intervene “to help moderate the conflict and protect the children from it.” 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.04 cmt. g, illus. 9, at 241. This seems 
to suggest that some significant parental fault may need to be shown as a prerequisite to stand-
ing, which would drastically limit the ambit—and attractiveness—of visitation actions by 
grandparents. 
 93. Thus, in 1998 there were 3.1 million children living with their never-married fa-
thers, and 6.7 million living with their never-married mother. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 85, 
at 92 tbl. 10. 
 94. So, for example, grandparents provide about sixteen percent of preschooler child 
care for employed mothers in this country. CENSUS BUR., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, WHO’S 
MINDING THE KIDS, SB/94-5 (1994). 
 95. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.04 cmt. g, at 240. 
 96. Indeed, it seems much more likely that grandparents, and through them their 
grandchildren, will more often need legal recourse for visitation rights where their son or 
daughter has been through an adversarial divorce proceeding with the custodial parent. Thus, 
in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the mother had voluntarily given substantial visita-
tion opportunities to the parents of her deceased husband prior to their action seeking even 
greater access—a factor weighed by the plurality in holding that the visitation petition intruded 
on the mother’s constitutional rights. Id. at 71. The early, kind actions of the mother in Troxel 
may be fairly typical of bereaved parents, whose grief may bind them even closer to their de-
ceased spouse’s parents. A recent survey of state statutes found, in fact, that more states (forty-
nine) permit grandparents to seek visitation in the context of divorce than in cases of parental 
death (forty-four). Elrod & Spector, supra note 3, at 665 tbl. 6. 
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portant in either case, as now perhaps providing the only available 
access to the history, values, and traditions of that side of the fam-
ily?97 Might not the presence of a grandparent often be more impor-
tant to a child who never knew her father, or whose father has di-
vorced and deserted her, than to one who enjoyed the benefit of a 
now deceased but loving father?98 There may be an underlying ra-
tionale for this strange distinction, but it remains entirely unex-
pressed and undeveloped.99 
Equally strange, though, is the failure to explain why divorced 
stepparents should have the right to petition for very substantial cus-
todial rights and grandparents cannot petition under most circum-
stances for even limited visitation. It is the former, not grandparents, 
who will already be the opposing party in a court proceeding. It is 
the divorcing stepparent, not a grandparent, who has something to 
gain in negotiations over property division by waving the red flag of 
custody litigation. And it is custodial rights in the stepparent, not 
visitation rights in a grandparent, that are most likely to compromise 
the existing relationship between the child and his noncustodial bio-
logical parent. Finally, it is stepparents and domestic partners, not 
grandparents, who are more likely to have engaged in abuse of the 
custodial parent or the child100—a fact of particular relevance given 
 
 97. In this respect, grandparent visitation statutes may simply have brought a child’s 
right to his intangible, personal inheritance from each side of his family in line with his rights 
regarding inherited property. Thus, it has never been possible for a parent, without court ap-
proval, to disclaim or renounce a bequest to her child. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-407(c), 
8 U.L.A. 386–87 (1998). For a sensitive exploration of the evidence, pro and con, concerning 
the role of grandparents in children’s lives, see generally Czapanskiy, supra note 86. 
 98. Indeed, where a noncustodial parent is alive but not around, a relationship with that 
parent’s parents may keep open channels of communication, and ultimately of reconciliation, 
that would otherwise be closed. In a recent article, I argued that a grandparent’s love for 
grandchildren is a crucial component of parents’ moral duties to care for and nurture their 
children. Gregory A. Loken, Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties Toward Children, 31 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1121, 1187–95 (1999). By staying in touch with their grandchild, grandparents 
may have greater moral force in calling their son or daughter back to a sense of responsibility 
for the child. 
 99. Neither the comments nor the Reporter’s Notes to this section specifically mention 
or discuss the widespread application of grandparent visitation statutes in circumstances involv-
ing divorce or unmarried parenting. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.04, 
at 232–46. 
 100. For an overview of the statistics on abuse of children by relatives versus nonrelatives, 
and an argument that the greater risk of abuse at the hands of adults without a biological link 
to the child is rooted in evolutionary development, see Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis 
in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1207–36 
(1997). Jones argues that child protective procedures should conceivably be modified to weigh 
8LOK.DOC 1/3/02  2:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1068 
chapter 2’s laudable recognition of domestic or child abuse as a fac-
tor permitting a court to reduce or deny custodial privileges to the 
abuser.101 Over one million children in this country live with at least 
one grandparent and no parent;102 the number living only with a 
stepparent is surely geometrically smaller. The drafters of chapter 2 
are simply silent in the face of these anomalies. 
The awkwardness of chapter 2 regarding grandparent rights may 
partially be the result of the choice early on to conflate traditional 
notions of custody and visitation into the general term “custodial re-
sponsibility.”103 While permitting great elegance of language 
throughout chapter 2, this general phrase does not permit nuances 
that the traditional terms embody and the grandparent visitation 
statutes exploit. The very fact that grandparents cannot possibly 
achieve full or joint physical custody under those laws makes their 
application, however controversial, limited in its potential for harm 
to parental autonomy. “Custodial responsibility,” because so much 
broader in its potential application, does seem in general a right we 
 
stepparenthood more heavily as a risk factor for abuse, and “establishing a stronger preference 
for the biological parent in child custody actions.” Id. at 1234–35. For an influential case that 
put great emphasis on the “biological fact that grandparents are bound to their grandchildren 
by the unbreakable links of heredity,” and could “ease the painful transition” after the death of 
a parent, see Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 204–05 (N.J. 1975). See also Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 251, 268–69 (2001) (finding that “the evidence is legion that stepfathers 
represent a greater portion of [sexual] abusers than their incidence in the general population”). 
 101. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.13, at 210–12. 
 102. KEN BRYSON & LYNNE M. CASPER, CENSUS BUR., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
CORESIDENT GRANDPARENTS AND GRANDCHILDREN 6 tbl. 2, P23–198 (1999) (showing 
598,000 grandchildren living with both grandparents and no parent and 669,000 living with 
the grandmother only and no parent). The percentage of children living only with grandpar-
ents increased from 1.3 percent in 1992 to 1.8 percent in 1997. Id. at 1. Of course, grandpar-
ents in that situation would often qualify for de facto parental status under the rubric of chap-
ter 2, which must be counted against the loss for other grandparents of legal standing under 
section 2.04. Yet somehow it seems unlikely that the majority of grandparents caring for their 
children’s children want full parental status—but instead find themselves forced into the role, 
with, as one study puts it, “a strong preference for informal kinship care.” Beatrice Yorker et 
al., Custodial Relationships of Grandparents Raising Grandchildren: Results of a Home-Based 
Intervention Study, JUV. & FAM. CT. J., Spring 1998, at 15, 20; see also id. at 16–18 (summa-
rizing studies showing that grandparents typically assume parental role only after previous child 
abuse, neglect or substance abuse by parent, and then face substantial stress and difficulties in 
the new role). 
 103. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.03(4), at 37–38. See 
supra text accompanying notes 17–18. For a discussion of the awkwardness of awarding sub-
stantial custodial as opposed to visitation rights to de facto parents, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 60–61. 
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would not want grandparents to have standing to seek. But that very 
breadth contains similar dangers for the proposed status of de facto 
parenthood, which would ultimately be much less threatening to 
core parent-child relationships if it gave less disruptive power to 
those who achieved it. 
A child, if she is lucky, receives over the course of her childhood 
the love and support of many adults outside her nuclear family, but 
this evolving, often makeshift extended family is usually rooted in the 
love those adults feel for the child’s parents. If it is desirable, as chap-
ter 2 declares, to give standing in custody litigation to those whose 
love for the parent was sexual, why not give similar rights to those, 
like grandparents, uncles, and aunts, whose love for the parent is of 
longer duration and, all too often, of greater durability? Chapter 2’s 
unstated but unmistakable preference for the romantic over the bio-
logical extended family is mysterious and ultimately perverse. 
V. STANDING AND REPRESENTATION RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 
The very fact, however, that reasonable minds can differ over the 
categories of adults who should have access to custody litigation and 
that every child caught up in such litigation faces serious dangers 
from an erroneous outcome, leads to one final puzzle with the stan-
dards of chapter 2. Why, in this perilous arena, is the child herself 
not entitled to representation and a voice? Although chapter 2 would 
permit the court to consider the “firm and reasonable preferences” 
of an older child regarding a custodial allocation,104 it does not give 
children a right to participate in custodial proceedings as a party,105 
and is virtually silent as to their rights to legal representation.106 This 
 
 104. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, § 2.09(b), at 248. 
 105. Id. § 2.04, at 232–33 (allowing intervention by nonparents only in “exceptional 
cases”). 
 106. Under the Principles, the court “[i]n its discretion . . . may appoint a lawyer to rep-
resent the child,” but only if it would be “helpful” to do so, and only “if the child is compe-
tent to direct the terms of the representation.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), su-
pra note 2, § 2.15(3), at 289. Likewise, the court has the discretion to “appoint a guardian ad 
litem to represent the child’s best interests.” Id. § 2.15(2). But the Principles give no guidance 
as to what circumstances would clearly call for such appointments, and the comments give 
prominence to the “significant difficulties” such appointments may present. Id. § 2.15 cmt. b, 
at 291–92. Moreover, simply being represented in the litigation does not give the child “stand-
ing” to raise claims for an adjustment of custodial rights, whether in favor of a biological or a 
de facto parent. Even fully represented children are not “parties” to the action under section 
2.04. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35. 
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is surprising, for while legal representation of small children in cus-
todial battles is of debatable merit,107 Chapter 2’s substantial broad-
ening of the potential claimants to custody increases the stakes for 
the child in such battles.108 The chance it creates for a child to live 
with a nonrelative no doubt means that in some cases it will be easier 
to reach a result that comes closer than present law allows to meeting 
the child’s “best interests.” But if there are more princes now avail-
able to the child, there are also more frogs. And, as outlined above, 
the risks of the property/custody trade-offs in private dissolution 
agreements rise substantially through the inclusion of stepparents 
and domestic partners among the players, and are amplified further 
by chapter 2’s strong requirement that judges defer to private cus-
tody agreements. Even if a child’s voice cannot always prevail in a 
proceeding of such moment, she at least ought to have standing to 
raise it.109 Otherwise, how will the “individualized . . . interests of 
 
 107. Compare GOLDSTEIN, supra note 22, at 141 (arguing that legal representation 
should be provided for a child when her parents commence a custody battle in court because 
she “then requires representation independent of her parents’ to assure that her interests are 
treated as paramount in determining who shall have custody”), and Catherine J. Ross, From 
Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1571, 1583–86 (1996) (arguing for appointment of counsel for children in contested 
custody disputes) with AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, REPRESENTING 
CHILDREN: STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEYS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM IN CUSTODY OR 
VISITATION PROCEEDINGS 9–12 (1994) (rejecting the idea that lawyers should be appointed 
for children in custody actions because such disputes are “private” and such representation is 
likely to create delays and additional costs) and Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Deter-
mining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1424–28 (1996) 
(rejecting idea that counsel should be appointed for “young children” in custody and visitation 
cases); see also Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representa-
tion of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1323 (1996) (listing under “recommendations 
for further study” whether “there should be mandatory appointment of counsel for children in 
disputed custody and visitation cases, and based upon what criteria”). 
 108. A particularly curious component of the Principles’ justification for rejecting a gen-
eral duty of appointment of an attorney or guardian ad litem is the fear that “appointment of 
an advocate for the child can constitute undesirable and inappropriate intrusions on the 
authority of parents.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, § 2.15 cmt. b, 
at 291. This, in a document providing full standing in custody litigation to stepparents and 
long-term roommates! 
 109. Thus, even the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, which opposes “rou-
tine” appointment of counsel or guardians ad litem in custody cases, recommends appointment 
when a court considers it “necessary in light of the particular circumstances of the case.” 
STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEYS AND GUARDIANS AD LITEM, supra note 107, at 9. Even in tradi-
tional two-parent divorce cases a leading researcher found a “troubling divergence between the 
wishes and attitudes of the children and their parents in regard to the divorce” that persisted 
for years after the process was complete. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, 
SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 305 (1996). 
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individual children,”110 purportedly a cornerstone of chapter 2’s ap-
proach, be realized? 
If the child at the center of the custody battle is given standing 
to intervene, moreover, the need to give de facto parents the auto-
matic right to litigate custody is likely to disappear. For the de facto 
parent-child relationship, if it exists at all, is two-sided, and it is the 
child’s loss of continuity that we fear. As Justice Brennan noted in 
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, if 
a foster parent “does not care enough about the child” to request a 
preremoval hearing, “it is difficult to see what right or interest of the 
foster child is protected by holding [such] a hearing.”111 Conversely, 
if a child does not care enough about a relationship with an adult 
who is not her biological parent to raise a claim seeking to preserve 
the relationship, it is hard to see the point of permitting that adult to 
complicate the custody proceeding with a de facto parenthood claim. 
Of course it is not a simple matter to determine what a child 
really “cares about,” and adult litigants can to some extent illuminate 
that issue.112 But courts could protect the interests of children in this 
area with far less danger to other important interests if they adopted 
three relatively modest reforms: (1) screening custody cases early to 
determine those in which a protected de facto parent-child relation-
ship might exist,113 (2) where such screening suggests the need for it, 
appointing a guardian ad litem or attorney for the child to investi-
gate and evaluate the nature of the relationship, and finally (3) grant-
ing standing to the child through her representative to advocate for 
preservation of important relationships with nonbiological parents in 
ongoing custody litigation.114 A guardian ad litem or child’s attor-
 
 110. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, Introduction, at 1. 
 111. 431 U.S. 816, 850–51 (1977). 
 112. Thus, Justice Brennan noted for the Court in Smith that foster parents could have a 
legitimate role in helping a court determine what are “the rights and interests” of the children 
affected. Id. at 841 n.44. Their standing, however, was, in the Court’s view, merely a “pruden-
tial” matter, while, by contrast, the appointment of independent counsel for the children—“so 
that the court could have the benefit of an independent advocate for the welfare of the chil-
dren, unprejudiced by the possibly conflicting interests and desires of the other parties”—was 
described in terms much closer to mandatory in character. Id. 
 113. Under the Principles, preliminary screening already appears to be required if a court 
receives “credible information” that child abuse, domestic abuse, drug abuse, or persistent in-
terference with custodial rights has occurred. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra 
note 2, § 2.13, at 210. 
 114. Thus, children with putative de facto relationship claims would thus receive the 
right, under section 2.04, “to be notified of and participate as a party in an action filed by an-
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ney, even if misguided in urging preservation of a de facto relation-
ship, will have none of the financial or personal motives to litigate 
the issues that can enter the arena if the putative de facto parents are 
themselves given standing to raise custodial claims.115 Limiting stand-
ing for de facto parenthood claims to the children involved in such 
relationships would provide the most direct, and least dangerous, 
approach to discovering their best interests—the goal, in the end, of 
all custody principles.116 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The standing principles of chapter 2 thus present, on this early 
reading, a substantial conundrum. Individuals whose only connec-
tion to the child is rooted in a now failed love for the child’s parent 
will have license to pursue in court virtually unlimited custodial privi-
leges regarding the child, even in the face of knowledge that some 
significant part of that litigation, or its threat, will be purely strategic. 
Those who succeed in their claims will become de facto parents, part 
of a new extended family for the child, a family that can continue to 
grow as the custodial parent moves on to other loves. As it wins new 
shares of the child’s limited time, this new extended family can 
crowd the custodial rights of the noncustodial biological parent. In 
the meantime, some voices of the traditional extended family will be 
silenced. Grandparents who have not lived with a child will not be 
able to seek visitation, or indeed any other role in the child’s life, ex-
cept in the rare circumstance of a parent’s death. They will be able to 
pass on family property to the child, but will have no standing to be-
stow family stories or a sense of belonging. Nor will the child, the 
 
other.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 2, at 55. Permitting children to 
initiate a proceeding for a custody change, absent parental abuse or neglect, arguably carries 
too many risks of family disruption to justify its adoption. Cf. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 
780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a lower court order giving an adolescent standing to 
pursue a termination of parental rights petition); see generally Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of 
Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 
345, 400–09 (1997) (discussing Gregory K. and other cases in which children have sought 
standing to pursue custodial claims). But see George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child: A 
Child’s Right to Be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365 (1993) (arguing for broad recognition of stand-
ing rights for children in custody cases). 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 66–73. 
 116. “There is consensus on the general principle that the law [of child custody] should 
seek to promote the child’s best interests.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra 
note 2, Introduction, at 3. 
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potential pawn in dissolution battles, typically be allowed to put for-
ward claims on her own behalf or have independent representation 
to ensure that any agreement reached by the parents protects her in-
terests. 
Nothing could be clearer from chapter 2 than its passionate 
commitment to addressing family disarray in a manner that furthers 
children’s interests and welfare, in part by broadening the conception 
of the family that is available to them. But the law, unfortunately, is a 
dangerous tool, not easily refitted to unfamiliar projects. It may be 
that chapter 2’s conception of de facto parenthood—and, conse-
quently, the new extended family—has merit. As currently con-
ceived, though, its interaction with crucial standing principles does 
not. 
8LOK.DOC 1/3/02  2:20 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1074 
 
